New Delhi
25 August 2007
* The risks far outweigh the gains, warns editorial of the CPI(M) mouthpiece
A nuclear deal with the United States that does not give India access
to full nuclear fuel cycle and dual-use technology is avoidable because it will only serve
to draw India into a US-dominated strategic partnership at the expense of her strategic
autonomy, according to strategic analysts and former diplomats tracking the proposed
India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement.
Prof Bharat Karnad of the New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research sought to suggest
that India does not need a nuclear pact with the US for getting uranium. India, he told this
newspaper, was getting yellowcake (uranium) from certain non-NSG (Nuclear Suppliers
Group) countries in the past and there was no reason why India cannot take that route
again. "[This deal] is a hoax, a fraud," he said.
A former secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, Mr Rajiv Sikri, has echoed similar
views. He has maintained that accelerating indigenous efforts to more efficiently mine
existing uranium deposits in the country, stepping up prospecting for new deposits, and
actively exploring possibilities of getting uranium from non-NSG members would have
made more sense.
The irony, according to Prof Karnad, is that India has not cared to leverage her good
relations with countries like Namibia, Niger, Uzbekistan, Nigeria, Uganda and Angola,
who are outside the NSG, for procuring natural uranium ore. Namibia and Uzbekistan are
among the largest producers of uranium; they also have the largest known reserves of
uranium.
He said: "We have done it in the past and we need to do it on a sustained basis, use our
leverage and begin to court those countries with aid or assistance." He acknowledged
that some of these non-NSG countries could become vulnerable to the US inducements
and the mines may be owned or operated by European companies but the sovereign
prerogative would remain with the governments of those non-NSG countries. "It's been
on our agenda but why are we not picking up on it?" he wondered.
Prof Karnad also observed that India can forget getting access to the advanced nuclear
technology if the frozen text of the 123 Agreement is operationalised. He cited the
instance of the US denying cutting-edge technology, including the "source codes", to the
United Kingdom for the F-35 joint strike fighter project funded by the UK, to ask: "If the
United Kingdom, which is the closest ally of the US, did not get what it paid for, do we
expect the US to be any more amenable to us?"
He emphasised that the Hyde Act makes it abundantly clear that India will be denied
reprocessing, enrichment and heavy water production technologies. The Hyde Act also
states explicitly that it is the responsibility of the US Government to ensure that no other
member of the NSG carries on trade with India that is violative of the provisions of the
Act. He said that the US Government will accordingly impose the same guidelines, as
are provided under the Hyde Act, on the NSG. What India can hope to get, he pointed out,
will only be a few reactors. "All this is to divert us from the fast breeder reactors for
harnessing of thorium," he asserted.
An article, titled "The 123 Agreement: Completing What NDA Had Begun", published in
the latest issue of People's Democracy, the CPI(M) weekly organ, debunked the quasi-
weapon status. "The United States made it amply clear to the world, on the eve of Bush's
visit to India, that in the framework of the Global Energy Partnership, countries like India
would have no access to reprocessing technology. Thus there was to be no opening up
of technology and collaboration across the entire nuclear fuel cycle. The US
administration has since stood steadfastly by this policy. Consistent with this
understanding, the United States has also clearly stood by its refusal to lift any
restrictions on dual-use technology related to enrichment or reprocessing."
An editorial in the CPI(M) mouthpiece, in turn, questioned whether the nuclear energy
expansion is the only option or even the best option that we have at the moment. It read:
"As of 2005, nuclear power generation was 3,310 MW or a mere 2.5 per cent of India's
total power generation capacity. Now, if this were to increase to 10,000 MW by the year
2,015 as planned, this would still be only five to seven per cent of India's projected
capacity generation then. Thus, this deal and the attendant consequences to India's
sovereignty and foreign policy are being undertaken for such a miniscule part of our
power generation."
The article said that the text of the 123 Agreement was "mere word play". "Thus, we have
'full civilian nuclear cooperation covering aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle,' a phrasing
that attempts to brush under the carpet the absence of cooperation covering the full
nuclear fuel cycle. The dual-use restrictions remain and will cover all enrichment and
reprocessing activity. This will undoubtedly be extended to cover the fast breeder
reactors as well, even if all the ones to be built will be in the domain safeguards. We can
build these fast breeders of course if we choose to, but with one hand tied behind our
backs through dual-use restrictions, while the entire activity takes place under
safeguards."
The article added: "The government has publicly expressed the hope that the NSG will
be kinder and be less restrictive on dual-use technologies. But this logic strangely
assumes that the United States, having gone through this effort in order to open up the
Indian nuclear power market, will now obligingly allow other countries to overtake it by
offering us the entire fuel cycle technology on more liberal terms."
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