New Delhi
10 August 2005
Notwithstanding the Bush administration's assertion that it will put
a specific programme about India-US nuclear cooperation in front of Congress when it
returns from recess, a July 29 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report suggests
potentially uncomfortable questions could be raised by lawmakers.
"How complete are India's declarations of civilian facilities? What is the level of
intrusiveness of the IAEA's programme to inspect those facilities? What are India's
plans for its nuclear weapons programme and what is the possibility that US assistance
could benefit that weapons programme?" are some of the questions that could engage
the attention of the Congress.
The CRS report titled "US nuclear cooperation with India: Issues for Congress" raises
another question that has caused some degree of concern among defence analysts in
New Delhi. "If India," the report asks, "is prepared to take on the responsibilities
undertaken by other nuclear weapon states, is it prepared to stop producing fissile
material for weapons? Is it prepared to declare some nuclear material as excess to its
defence needs and place that material under IAEA safeguards?"
The report welcomes India's commitments to separate its civil and strategic nuclear
facilities, etc, but says there are no measures in this global partnership to restrain
India's nuclear weapons programme. "A significant question is how India, in the absence
of full-scope safeguards, can provide adequate confidence that US peaceful nuclear
technology will not be diverted to nuclear weapons purposes," it wonders.
There are nine criteria that an agreement must meet unless the President exempts the
agreement. The most important of these with respect to India is the full-scope safeguards
requirement for non-nuclear weapon states. "[The] President likely will have to exempt
the agreement for cooperation from [the] full-scope safeguards requirement," says the
report but an exempted agreement could only become effective if Congress enacts a
joint resolution of approval.
If implemented, the report argues, India-US nuclear cooperation would dramatically shift
US nonproliferation policy and practice towards India. "Such cooperation," it hastens to
add, "would also contravene the multilateral export control guidelines of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group".
It would also require loosening Washington's own nuclear export legislation as well as
creating an NSG exception. The Bush administration has not revealed publicly how it will
handle NSG guidelines but, the report cautions, "consensus among the 44 NSG
members is not always assured."
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