4 April 2014
On March 27, India, departing from its usual voting pattern
on UNHRC resolutions critical of Sri Lanka, abstained from casting its vote on
the resolution that approved an independent international investigation into
certain alleged war crimes and human rights violations committed by the Sri
Lankan government during the 2009 civil war against the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
The “explanation of vote” by India’s permanent
representative to the UN offices in Geneva among other things, stated that “In
asking the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to
investigate, assess and monitor the human rights situation in Sri Lanka, the
resolution ignores the progress already made by the country in this field and
places in jeopardy the cooperation currently taking place between the
Government of Sri Lanka and the OHCHR and the Council’s Special Procedures.
Besides, the resolution is inconsistent and impractical in asking both the
Government of Sri Lanka and the OHCHR to simultaneously conduct
investigations.” “…adopting an intrusive approach that undermines national
sovereignty and institutions is counterproductive,” he added.
Evidently, India's abstention was dictated as much by
necessity and self-preservation as by a desire to place bilateralism at the
front and centre of New Delhi’s ties with Colombo.
After having voted for the UNHRC resolutions on Sri Lanka in
2012 and 2013, India’s abstention this year was indicative of a course
correction in India’s engagement with Sri Lanka that was aimed at retrieving
the ground lost in the intervening years, burnishing India’s credentials as a
relevant player in the island nation’s affairs and signalling a return to
bilateralism as the centrepiece of New Delhi – Colombo ties. If India’s support
for the resolutions in the preceding years exposed an utter bankruptcy of ideas
on engaging Sri Lanka (thereby implicitly admitting to a failure on the part of
New Delhi to either influence the course of events or bring about the desired
change in Colombo’s disposition), its abstention should be seen as a belated
attempt to pull the relationship back from the brink.
Indeed the muted reactions from the regional political
parties provided New Delhi with room to manoeuvre, and in the process, enabled
it to reclaim its voice vis-à-vis the Tamil Nadu state government and other
regional political parties on foreign policy issues.
Particularly worrying for the Indian Ministry of External
Affairs is the phenomenon of erosion of New Delhi’s position in what it calls
its sphere of influence. The debate over ways India should have voted at the
last three UNHRC resolutions on Sri Lanka is instructive to the extent that it
illustrates how far India has come from being an influential actor in its
neighbourhood to being a marginal or fringe player. Some key questions were:
Was it advisable for New Delhi to vote for the resolutions and risk losing
whatever goodwill and leverage it might have had with Colombo? Shouldn’t all
other options have been exhausted before India threw in the towel and threw in
its lot with the West? India’s abstention this year has partially answered that
question.
At present, India cannot claim to adhere to a consistent
policy towards Sri Lanka. First it nurtured the LTTE and burnt its fingers in
the process. It then extended tacit support to Colombo – before, during and
after the end of the Sri Lankan civil war in May 2009 – only to subsequently
support the UNHRC resolution piloted by the US. The 2013 Commonwealth Heads of
Government Meeting summit in Sri Lanka was as much in the news for the renewed
focus on Colombo’s human rights record as for the Indian prime minister’s
decision to refrain from attending it, and instead, leave it to the Indian
External Affairs Minister to lead New Delhi’s delegation. In a letter of regret
hand-delivered to Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa, Singh informed
Rajapaksa of his inability to attend personally but without providing reasons.
Suffice to say that a careful reading of the history of
India-Sri Lanka relations would make it evident that New Delhi’s policy towards
Colombo can be described as consistently inconsistent, characterised by myopia
and self-inflicted crises.
It is time to reshape India’s neighbourhood policy in a
manner that reflects the broadest possible national consensus on the way forward
in our relations with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Nepal, Bangladesh, Maldives,
Bhutan and Sri Lanka. Irrespective of which coalition forms the next government
in New Delhi, a reset is necessary. India can ill-afford a Pavlovian foreign
policy, and/or framing India’s foreign policy options as a binary choice. There
is need for greater appreciation of several shades of grey.
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