New Delhi
25 July 2009
Opinion is divided among some sections of the Indian intelligence and
diplomatic communities on the outcome of the July 16 talks between Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh and his Pakistani counterpart Yousuf Raza Gilani at Sharm-El-Sheikh.
While the former blames New Delhi for agreeing to an inappropriately-worded Joint
Statement which has a reference to Balochistan, the latter believes the Joint Statement
should not be dismissed out of hand and that there is some merit in the Government's
case for wanting to pursue talks, although a limited one, with Pakistan.
A former Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) hand was critical of New Delhi for creating
an avoidably messy situation by including the reference to Balochistan in the Joint
Statement. The former R&AW hand, who did not want to be named, felt that the original
mistake of drafting a peculiar Joint Statement would not make it any easy for New Delhi
to explain or retrieve its position. It may be recalled that the Indian intelligence
establishment was not entirely convinced after India and Pakistan agreed to, in the 16
September 2006 Joint Statement adopted at Havana, to establish a joint anti-terror
mechanism.
However, Salman Haidar, a former foreign secretary, thought the talks in Sharm-El-
Sheikh went very well; Gilani, like Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari before him at
Yekaterinburg, showed an inclination to go forward on terrorism and take effective action
on the ground. Having said that, Mr Haidar felt it would have been better if New Delhi had
offered an explanation of the Joint Statement earlier, to quell avoidable speculation. He
also said the Joint Statement was so drafted that there was something for both sides to
take away, and it gave India the option to say that composite dialogue will restart only
when Pakistan takes certain steps against terrorism. He went on to suggest that meeting
Pakistan's wishes to mention Balochistan in the Joint Statement could be seen as an
incentive for that country to come good on its commitment of stopping terrorism against
India.
For its part, official circles insisted that New Delhi had clean hands and clean
conscience on Balochistan, and it would not shy away from a discussion on Balochistan
if Islamabad wanted to raise what was essentially an internal matter of Pakistan.
Responding to the other criticism of New Delhi appeasing Gilani, who has arrived at a
modus vivendi with the Pakistani Army and the ISI, by agreeing to delink talks from
action on terrorism and to include a reference to Balochistan, and unwittingly isolating
Zardari in the process, the official circles said New Delhi was not in the business of
picking and choosing leaders, and New Delhi's responses would only be governed by
Islamabad's actions against terrorism. Obliquely, they also suggested that the media
frenzy surrounding the Sharm-El-Sheikh talks might have made it difficult for the Indian
and the Pakistani delegations to conclude the talks without issuing a joint statement.
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