NSG tightens rules, but US reassures India

New Delhi

24 June 2011

Access to sensitive nuclear technologies used for the enrichment of uranium or the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel just got tougher, with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) approving new guidelines to limit their transfers only to the countries complying with their non-proliferation obligations and that meet agreed standards for nuclear safeguards, safety and security.

On the face of it, the three non-NPT signatories of India, Pakistan and Israel could be affected by the amendments, but, equally, other countries of concern could be the targets, too. However, the US department of state has clarified that the new restrictions should not be construed as detracting from the "unique impact and importance" of the US-India nuclear deal or diluting the US' commitment to full civil nuclear cooperation with India.

Simply put, the new guidelines would not impinge or adversely affect the "clean" NSG exception given to India in September 2008 or restrict India's access to enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies. Also, India remains on course for becoming the 47th member of the nuclear cartel, which was formed in 1974 in response to the nuclear test by India earlier that year.

A US state department press release said, "The NSG's NPT references, including those in the ENR guidelines, in no way detract from the exception granted to India by NSG members in 2008 and in no way reflect upon India's non-proliferation record." It also noted that "efforts in the NSG to strengthen controls on the transfers of ENR are consistent with long-standing US policy that pre-dates the civil nuclear agreement [with India] and have been reaffirmed on an annual basis by the G-8 for years."

Further, it iterated the US' support for India's membership of the NSG and three other export control regimes -- the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Missile Technology Control Regime -- in a phased manner. The US was understood to have circulated a note on India's membership of the NSG, proposing in it that signing on to the NPT need not be a mandatory criterion. India recognises that becoming an NSG member will take time because the group operates by consensus, and all members, China included, need to unanimously make a decision.

On the eve of the NSG's meeting, India had voiced deep reservations about a move by the cartel to withhold the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology to the non-NPT signatories. It had contended that doing so would dilute the import or the message of the exemption granted to India in 2008. Recently, foreign secretary Nirupama Rao had discussed this, and other matters, with Ellen Tauscher, the US under secretary of state for arms control and international security affairs, in Vienna. Ms Rao had also impressed upon her American interlocutor that India's membership of the four export control regimes should be a package deal.

PM: No annual US certification needed; says reprocessing right is permanent, IAEA safeguards pact will be taken up soon

New Delhi

13 August 2007

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Monday told Parliament that the

United States has given "permanent" consent for India to reprocess spent nuclear fuel

and that the US cooperation with India will not be subject to an annual certification

process.

"Our reprocessing rights are upfront and are permanent in nature," he told the Lok

Sabha. (His statement was tabled in the Rajya Sabha.) He added: "US cooperation with

India is a permanent one. There is no provision that states that US cooperation with India

will be subject to an annual certification process."

His statement made no reference to the Hyde Act, which has been cited by the Left

parties to oppose the proposed India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement. CPI(M)

General Secretary Prakash Karat has referred Section 104 g (2) E (i) rpt Section 104 g (2)

E (i) of the Hyde Act to suggest that the annual certification and reporting to the US

Congress by the President on a variety of foreign policy issues would be enforced by

successive US Presidents to coerce India to accept the strategic goals of the US.

Again, Article 14 (9) of the 123 Agreement does not reflect fully his assertion that

reprocessing rights are permanent in nature. The Article states that the arrangements

and procedures for reprocessing fuel will be concluded later and they "shall be subject

to suspension by either party".

Prime Minister Singh said that the finalisation of an India-specific safeguards agreement

with the International Atomic Energy Agency "is being taken up shortly", ignoring the

demand made by the opposition BJP-led NDA, the UNPA and the Left parties alike that

the next steps for operationalising the agreement should be put on hold.

"We have negotiated this agreement as an equal partner," he asserted. "There is no

question that we will ever compromise, in any manner, our independent foreign policy.

We shall retain our strategic autonomy [and] the agreement does not in any way impact

on India's ability to produce and utilise fissile material for its current and future strategic

needs."

He said that the concept of full civil nuclear cooperation has been clearly enshrined in

the 123 Agreement. He, however, hastened to add that the US has a policy of not

supplying to any country enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production

technology but the agreement provides for such transfers to India through an

amendment.

He said: "Forward-looking language has been included for dual use transfers of

enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production facilities. We hope transfers will

become possible as cooperation develops and expands in the future."

He clarified that the agreement did not affect India's right to conduct nuclear tests, if it

was necessary in the national interest, because a multi-layered consultation process

has been included with regard to "any future events" that may be cited as a reason to

seek cessation of cooperation or termination of the agreement.

Prime Minister Singh said that there was no change in India's position that she would

accept only IAEA safeguards on our civilian nuclear facilities. "This would also be in a

phased manner and as identified for that purpose in the Separation Plan, and only when

all international restrictions on nuclear trade with India have been lifted. India will not

take any irreversible steps with the IAEA prior to this," he emphasised.

He justified the nuclear pact with the US on the ground that even if India were to exploit

all her known resources of coal, oil, gas and hydropower, she would still be confronted

with a yawning demand and supply gap.

"Nuclear energy," he said, "is a logical choice for India. Indigenous supplies of uranium

are highly inadequate and hence we need to source uranium supply from elsewhere."

He went on to suggest that there would be "major spin-offs" for the private and public

sector industries in the area of high technology trade. Another major gain for India, he

pointed out, would be creation of opportunities for Indian scientists to participate in the

international activities.