NSG tightens rules, but US reassures India

New Delhi

24 June 2011

Access to sensitive nuclear technologies used for the enrichment of uranium or the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel just got tougher, with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) approving new guidelines to limit their transfers only to the countries complying with their non-proliferation obligations and that meet agreed standards for nuclear safeguards, safety and security.

On the face of it, the three non-NPT signatories of India, Pakistan and Israel could be affected by the amendments, but, equally, other countries of concern could be the targets, too. However, the US department of state has clarified that the new restrictions should not be construed as detracting from the "unique impact and importance" of the US-India nuclear deal or diluting the US' commitment to full civil nuclear cooperation with India.

Simply put, the new guidelines would not impinge or adversely affect the "clean" NSG exception given to India in September 2008 or restrict India's access to enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies. Also, India remains on course for becoming the 47th member of the nuclear cartel, which was formed in 1974 in response to the nuclear test by India earlier that year.

A US state department press release said, "The NSG's NPT references, including those in the ENR guidelines, in no way detract from the exception granted to India by NSG members in 2008 and in no way reflect upon India's non-proliferation record." It also noted that "efforts in the NSG to strengthen controls on the transfers of ENR are consistent with long-standing US policy that pre-dates the civil nuclear agreement [with India] and have been reaffirmed on an annual basis by the G-8 for years."

Further, it iterated the US' support for India's membership of the NSG and three other export control regimes -- the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Missile Technology Control Regime -- in a phased manner. The US was understood to have circulated a note on India's membership of the NSG, proposing in it that signing on to the NPT need not be a mandatory criterion. India recognises that becoming an NSG member will take time because the group operates by consensus, and all members, China included, need to unanimously make a decision.

On the eve of the NSG's meeting, India had voiced deep reservations about a move by the cartel to withhold the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology to the non-NPT signatories. It had contended that doing so would dilute the import or the message of the exemption granted to India in 2008. Recently, foreign secretary Nirupama Rao had discussed this, and other matters, with Ellen Tauscher, the US under secretary of state for arms control and international security affairs, in Vienna. Ms Rao had also impressed upon her American interlocutor that India's membership of the four export control regimes should be a package deal.

PM: No annual US certification needed; says reprocessing right is permanent, IAEA safeguards pact will be taken up soon

New Delhi

13 August 2007

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Monday told Parliament that the

United States has given "permanent" consent for India to reprocess spent nuclear fuel

and that the US cooperation with India will not be subject to an annual certification

process.

"Our reprocessing rights are upfront and are permanent in nature," he told the Lok

Sabha. (His statement was tabled in the Rajya Sabha.) He added: "US cooperation with

India is a permanent one. There is no provision that states that US cooperation with India

will be subject to an annual certification process."

His statement made no reference to the Hyde Act, which has been cited by the Left

parties to oppose the proposed India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement. CPI(M)

General Secretary Prakash Karat has referred Section 104 g (2) E (i) rpt Section 104 g (2)

E (i) of the Hyde Act to suggest that the annual certification and reporting to the US

Congress by the President on a variety of foreign policy issues would be enforced by

successive US Presidents to coerce India to accept the strategic goals of the US.

Again, Article 14 (9) of the 123 Agreement does not reflect fully his assertion that

reprocessing rights are permanent in nature. The Article states that the arrangements

and procedures for reprocessing fuel will be concluded later and they "shall be subject

to suspension by either party".

Prime Minister Singh said that the finalisation of an India-specific safeguards agreement

with the International Atomic Energy Agency "is being taken up shortly", ignoring the

demand made by the opposition BJP-led NDA, the UNPA and the Left parties alike that

the next steps for operationalising the agreement should be put on hold.

"We have negotiated this agreement as an equal partner," he asserted. "There is no

question that we will ever compromise, in any manner, our independent foreign policy.

We shall retain our strategic autonomy [and] the agreement does not in any way impact

on India's ability to produce and utilise fissile material for its current and future strategic

needs."

He said that the concept of full civil nuclear cooperation has been clearly enshrined in

the 123 Agreement. He, however, hastened to add that the US has a policy of not

supplying to any country enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production

technology but the agreement provides for such transfers to India through an

amendment.

He said: "Forward-looking language has been included for dual use transfers of

enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production facilities. We hope transfers will

become possible as cooperation develops and expands in the future."

He clarified that the agreement did not affect India's right to conduct nuclear tests, if it

was necessary in the national interest, because a multi-layered consultation process

has been included with regard to "any future events" that may be cited as a reason to

seek cessation of cooperation or termination of the agreement.

Prime Minister Singh said that there was no change in India's position that she would

accept only IAEA safeguards on our civilian nuclear facilities. "This would also be in a

phased manner and as identified for that purpose in the Separation Plan, and only when

all international restrictions on nuclear trade with India have been lifted. India will not

take any irreversible steps with the IAEA prior to this," he emphasised.

He justified the nuclear pact with the US on the ground that even if India were to exploit

all her known resources of coal, oil, gas and hydropower, she would still be confronted

with a yawning demand and supply gap.

"Nuclear energy," he said, "is a logical choice for India. Indigenous supplies of uranium

are highly inadequate and hence we need to source uranium supply from elsewhere."

He went on to suggest that there would be "major spin-offs" for the private and public

sector industries in the area of high technology trade. Another major gain for India, he

pointed out, would be creation of opportunities for Indian scientists to participate in the

international activities.

Left says 123 pact falls short of PM promises

New Delhi

7 August 2007

The Left parties on Tuesday conveyed to Prime Minister Manmohan

Singh that his assurance to Parliament, that the proposed India-United States civilian

nuclear cooperation agreement will cover the entire nuclear fuel cycle, will be violated

under the terms set by the Hyde Act. They also said that a careful study of the 123

Agreement suggested that the Prime Minister's other assurances on India getting full

civilian nuclear cooperation including, but not limited to, sensitive nuclear technology,

dual-use items or uninterrupted fuel supply, were not likely to be met either.

The statement issued on Tuesday by the Left parties read: "While the 123 Agreement is

being presented as a victory for India's positions and conforming to the Prime Minister's

assurances in Parliament, we find that there are a number of issues on which it falls

short of what the Prime Minister had assured Parliament. While the Indian commitments

are binding and in perpetuity, some of the commitments that the US has made are either

quite ambiguous or are ones that can be terminated at a future date."

CPI(M) General Secretary Prakash Karat, who was joined by D Raja (CPI), Abani Roy

(RSP) and Devarajan (AIFB) for the news conference, said that under the terms set by the

Hyde Act, it was clear that one of the key assurances given by Prime Minister to

Parliament on August 17, 2006 -- that India-US nuclear cooperation would cover the entire

nuclear fuel cycle -- would be violated.

He said: "The proposed 123 Agreement while superficially using the original wording of

the joint statement of 2005, full civilian nuclear cooperation, denies cooperation or

access in any form whatsoever to fuel enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water

production technologies. The statement of intent in the agreement that a suitable

amendment to enable this access may be considered in the future has little or no

operative value."

Mr Karat said that despite some "skillful drafting" of the 123 Agreement, its text did not

reflect the Prime Minister's assurances. He said that it was certain that successive

presidents of the US and the US Congress will be bound by the Hyde Act and this had

implications for future.

The Left parties were categorical that the direction in the Hyde Act with regard to the

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) was unacceptable. They went on to reiterate that

the denial of technology extended to transfers of dual-use items that could be used in

enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water production facilities, which are again a

stipulation of the Hyde Act.

Their statement said: "Under these terms, a wide range of sanctions on a host of

technologies would continue, falling well short of full civilian nuclear cooperation. Even

in the new facilities built for reprocessing the spent fuel under safeguards, the onerous

technological sanctions implied by the dual-use label will apply. This is certainly a major

departure from what the Prime Minister had assured the House that this deal recognises

India as an advanced nuclear power and will allow access to full civilian technologies".

Mr Karat said that a number of conditions inserted into the Hyde Act pertained to areas

outside nuclear cooperation and are attempts to coerce India to accept the strategic

goals of the US. He listed three specific issues:

* One, annual certification and reporting to the US Congress by the American President

on a variety of issues such as India's foreign policy being "congruent to that of the US"

and more specifically India joining US efforts in isolating and even sanctioning Iran,

which is dealt with under Section 104 g (2) E (i) rpt 104 g (2) E (i) of the Hyde Act.

* Two, Indian participation and formal declaration of support for the US's highly

controversial Proliferation Security Initiative including the "illegal" policy of interdiction

of vessels in international waters, as per Section 104 g (2) K rpt 104 g (2) K.

* Three, India conforming to various bilateral and/or multilateral agreements to which

India is not currently a signatory such as the US's Missile Technology Control Regime

(MTCR), the Australia Group, etc, as suggested under Section 104 c E, F, G rpt 104 c E, F,

G.

Mr Karat added: "All of these are a part of the Hyde Act [and the] termination clause is

wide-ranging and does not limit itself to only violation of the agreement as a basis for

cessation or termination of the contract."